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THE REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND PROCEDURAL CRITIQUE OF AN
ILLINOIS REMEDY
Effective methods of protection are essential for the promotion of
consumer interests. I The enactment of remedial legislation contributes
to the development of consumer rights.2 Accordingly, statutory regula-
tion of real estate brokers and salesmen is designed to protect the pub-
lic from persons not qualified to engage in the real estate business. 3
Toward this end, the Illinois General Assembly adopted a new regula-
tory act in 1973,4 which was the genesis of the Illinois Real Estate Re-
covery Fund.5 The fund's main purpose is to provide compensation for
damages incurred as a result of the wrongful activities of real estate
licensees. 6
While real estate licensees are subject to regulatory legislation in
every state and the District of Columbia,7 twelve states provide no ad-
ditional monetary remedy to augment common law actions.8 However,
most state legislatures recognize the need to afford greater protection to
1. See generally Symposium-Consumer Protection, 12 NEW ENG. L. REV. 849 (1977); Con-
sumer Protection Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976); Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 17.41-
17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
3. See THE FLA. SENATE ECONOMIC, COMMUNITY & CONSUMER AFFAIRS COMM., A RE-
VIEW OF CH. 475, FLA. STATUTES REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAW 65 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
REVIEW OF FLORIDA REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAW]; Levine, Real Estate Recovery Funds-Public
Protection Against Broker Malpractice, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 166 (1976); Romero, Theories of Real
Estate Broker Liability- Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767 (1978);
Comment, The Real Estate Broker Purchaser Relationship: Louisiana and Common Law, 52 TUL.
L. REV. 157, 169-70 (1977); Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller
Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1343, 1343-44 (1972). See also Epley & Armbrust, Legal Limita-
tions on Real Estate Prelicensing Requirements, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 15 (1978).
4. The Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen License Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 570 1-
5743, 5701 (1977 & Supp. 1978) (repealing the licensing act of 1921).
5. Id. §§ 5716-5725 (previously codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 114 1/2, §§ 108.1-108.10
(1975)).
6. Id. § 5716 (1977). See note 42 and accompanying text infra. Also, a recovery fund may
foster increased public confidence in the real estate industry. Duty, Real Estate Licensee Recovery
Fund, the California Experience, 7 BEVERLY HILLS B.J. 13, 14 (May-June 1973) [hereinafter cited
as Duty].
7. See REVIEW OF FLORIDA REAL ESTATE LICENSE LAW, supra note 3, at 139-45.
8. Real Estate Broker & Salesperson Act, Pub. L. No. 248, H.B. No. 1715 (1979) (to be
codified at IND. CODE §§ 25-34.1-1-1 to 25-34.1-6-2) (eff. date Dec. 31, 1979); IOWA CODE ANN
§§ 117.1-117.53 (West Supp. 1979-1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 4001-4119 (1964 &
Supp. 1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 339 (1966 & Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-885.01 to 81-
885.48 (Cumm. Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 331A (1966 & Supp. 1977); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW §§ 440-442 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978-1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A (1975 &
Cumm. Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 431-448 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1979-1980); S.C.
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the public. Twelve states and the District of Columbia require some or
all licensed real estate practitioners to post a surety bond with the li-
censing agency.9 The bond is used to reimburse aggrieved persons in
the event that a judgment is recovered against the licensee. 10 Twenty-
six states have enacted statutes which provide for real estate recovery
funds. "1
Prior to the introduction of the real estate recovery fund concept
by the Arizona legislature in 1963,12 the surety bond was the principal
regulatory protection against a licensee's wrongful conduct. A majority
of states have adopted the recovery fund remedy, while many of them
have abandoned the surety bond remedy.' 3 Several factors account for
CODE §§ 40-57-10 to 40-57-240(1976 & Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 2211-2301 (1975 &
Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 452.01-452.20 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979-1980).
9. ALA. CODE § 34-27-3 Ic, d (1975) (brokers $8,000, salespersons $6,000); D.C. CODE
§ 1405 (1973 & Supp. 1978) (brokers $2,500, salespersons $1,000); LA. REV. STAT. § 37:1447 (West
1974) ($5,000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 87TT (West Supp. 1979) ($1,000); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 451.215a (Supp. 1979-1980) (discretionary maximum of $5,000 if applicant's license
was revoked previously); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-35-29 (Supp. 1978) (set by regulatory agency);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-1933 (Supp. 1977) ($10,000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-24-28A (1974)
($1,500); OR. REV. STAT. § 696.525 (1977) (escrow agents $25,000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1319
(1976) (brokers $10,000, salespersons $2,500); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.85.300 (1978) (brokers
$5,000, salespersons $1,000); W. VA. CODE § 47-12-6 (1976) (non-residents $2,000); WYo. STAT.
§ 33-28-107(c) (1977) ($1,000).
10. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-1933 (Supp. 1977). See generaly Annot., 17
A.L.R.2d 1012 (1951).
11. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.85.010-45.85.110 (Supp. 1978); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2186
to 32-2193 (1976 & Supp. 1978-1979) (scheduled for review in 1981 under sunset law, id. §§ 41-
2351, 41-2354 & 41-2362 (Supp. 1978-1979)); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1307 to 71-1325 (Interim
Supp. 1979): CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10470-10483 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 12-61-301 to 12-61-305 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-324 (West Supp. 1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2921 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 475.481-475.486 (West Supp.
1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1424 (1979); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 467-16 to 467-25 (1976 & Supp.
1978); IDAHO CODE § 54-2035 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 5716-5725 (1977 & Supp. 1978);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3023 to 58-3033 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 324.400-324.420 (1977 &
Supp. 1978); MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 217A (1972 & Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34
(West Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 645.841-645.850 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:15-34 to
45:15-42 (West 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-23.2-01 to 43-23.2-13 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4735.12 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 858-601 to 858-605 (West Supp.
1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.5-5 (Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 36-21-55 to
36-21-71 (1977); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. tit. I 13A, art. 6573a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-2a-I to 61-2a-12 (1978); VA. CODE §§ 54-765.1 to 54-765.9 (1978).
Refer to notes 107-114 infra for cases that have construed and applied several of the recovery
fund statutes.
12. Real Estate Recovery Fund Act, Laws 1963, ch. 42, § I (codified at ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 32-2186 to 32-2193 (1976 & Supp. 1979-1980)). For a brief history of the real estate
recovery fund concept and its relationship to a fund which originated in England for the compen-
sation of loss to the public due to the dishonesty of an attorney, see Duty, supra note 6, at 14.
13. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1305(c) (Supp. 1975) (repealed Dec. 31, 1979 by Act of Feb.
7, 1979, No. 73 § 8, 1979 Ark. Acts). The Arkansas General Assembly determined that since an
emergency existed, the recovery fund should be effective upon its enactment:
[T]he current methods of bonding real estate brokers and salesmen are ineffective to
secure appropriate relief to victims of unethical and unscrupulous brokers and salesmen,
and that this Act is immediately necessary in order to remedy such situation. An emer-
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the change. Not all licensees are bondable, as some are perceived by
surety companies to be bad risks. In many of the states which use the
bond remedy, the required amount of surety coverage is insufficient
because the cost to the licensee of obtaining adequate protection is sub-
stantial.' 4 In contrast, all real estate licensees are subject to the provi-
sions of the recovery fund statutes, including the mandatory
contribution of a portion of licensing fees.' 5 While most recovery
funds allow for substantial compensation, the cost of maintaining these
funds has been minimized. 16 The recovery fund remedy may, in some
cases, reduce the amount of time a claimant must wait before obtaining
compensation. 17 In short, the recovery funds provide greater monetary
coverage to the public and include within their coverage more licensees
than most surety bond provisions.' 8
This note will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the Illinois
Real Estate Recovery Fund by examining the experience of other states
with similar funds. First, the provisions of the Illinois fund will be
summarized. Next, this note will assess the constitutionality of the Illi-
nois statute with respect to the penalties and disabilities which it im-
poses upon licensees. Also, this note will consider the practicality of
gency is therefore declared to exist and this Act, being necessary for the preservation of
the public peace, health, welfare, and safety, shall be effective from and after its passage
and approval.
Id. § 10, reprinted in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1305 (Interim Supp. 1979) (annotation). Contra,
MASS. H. No. 250 (1979) (which would have established a real estate recovery fund, but was
rejected). In theory, a recovery fund could be used to supplement bonding requirements; the
Massachusetts bill provided that the bond should be retained and its amount increased. Id. § 2.
In practice, as the Arkansas example illustrates, enacted recovery funds have displaced bonding
methods.
14. See Duty, supra note 6, at 14. Duty noted that a broker's surety coverage often is
dropped after the first claim. Id. If the maximum liability under the bond has been discharged in
the payment of other claims, recovery is precluded. Johnson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 576 S.W.2d 220,
222 (Ark. 1979). See note 9 supra for the minimum bond required by the states which utilize this
remedy. In 1973, it was estimated that it would cost more than $60 annually to purchase a $10,000
surety bond. Duty, supra note 6, at 14.
15. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 5716, 5717 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34 subd. 3, 4
(West Supp. 1979).
16. Eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5716 (1977) ($10,000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.5-5(a)
(Supp. 1978) ($20,000). But see IDAHO CODE § 54-2035B (1979), which permits a maximum re-
covery of only $2,000 per licensee per calendar year.
In Illinois, for example, when a real estate broker applies for an original certificate of registra-
tion, he pays $10 of his total licensing fees into the recovery fund. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11,
§§ 5716, 5729 (1977). If the balance remaining in the fund at the end of the year falls below
$150,000, he is assessed an additional $10 ($5 for salesmen) when his license is renewed. Id.
§ 5717. In California, it was estimated that it would cost a real estate licensee approximately 94¢
per year (63C per year for salesmen) in payments to the recovery fund "for that which is compara-
ble to fidelity coverage of $10,000/$20,000." Duty, supra note 6, at 15.
17. Twenty-Second Annual Survey of Developments in Virginia Law, 1976-1977, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1350, 1476 (1977).
18. See Utah Legislative Survey--1975, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 790, 815.
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the proceedings which determine the liability of the Illinois fund, and
the reasonableness of the limitation of the fund's liability for the activi-
ties of any single licensee. Finally, procedural changes in Illinois' Real
Estate Recovery Fund will be proposed.
PROVISIONS OF THE ILLINOIS REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND
Illinois' Real Estate Recovery Fund is designed to provide pay-
ment to persons who have obtained valid but unsatisfied judgments
against licensed real estate brokers. 19 The cause of action must have
arisen from the broker's professional activities. 20 The judgment must
be based "upon the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit,
which occurred on or after January 1, 1974. ' '21 Recovery from the fund
is limited to actual cash damages incurred; 22 losses in market value and
any punitive damages awarded against the broker may not be reim-
bursed from the fund. Costs of suit and attorney's fees may be reim-
bursed by the fund up to fifteen percent of the amount of actual
damages awarded. 23 The maximum payment from the recovery fund
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5718(b) (1977). Accord, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10471
(Supp. 1979). The judgment debtor must be licensed when the injurious act occurs. In re Mar-
riage of Powers, 96 Cal. App. 3d 440, 158 Cal. Rptr. 92, 96 (1979).
For purposes of this note the terms "real estate broker" or "broker" when used in reference to
the Illinois statute include any "real estate broker," "real estate broker-salesman," "real estate
salesman" or "unlicensed employee of a real estate broker." These categories are within the ambit
of the Illinois recovery fund. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I II, § 5716 (1977).
20. Id. See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 5718(b) (1977). However, section 5716 describes more gener-
ally the range of activities for which recovery is possible, including "an act, representation, trans-
action or conduct" of a broker which is in violation of the licensing act or regulations promulgated
by the licensing agency. For example, a broker or his agent may neglect to place a buyer's earnest
money deposit in an escrow fund in violation of the regulations. ILLINOIS DEPT. OF REGISTRA-
TION & EDUC., RULES & REGULATIONS PROMULGATED FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE REAL
ESTATE BROKERS & SALESMEN LICENSE ACT § IV (1977). Whether the buyer could recover from
the fund if the broker went bankrupt is open to dispute as any judgment obtained would not be
based on fraud, misrepresentation or deceit. While payment from most similar funds is limited to
these grounds, negligence is included expressly as grounds for recovery from the Colorado fund.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-302(1) (1978).
As of January 1, 1979, the Illinois Department of Registration reported that it had received
notice of five suits out of 163 which were not based on any of the requisite grounds for recovery.
Real Estate Recovery Status Report as of Jan. I, 1979, at 1-2 (unpublished report of the Illinois
Department of Registration and Education on file at the Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Status Report].
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 5716 (1977).
23. Id. On its face, the statute does not specify whether the term "actual damages" refers to
the amount of actual damages awarded against the judgment debtor, or the amount of actual
damages awarded from the recovery fund. One circuit court initially approved the former inter-
pretation. McDonald v. Eich, No. W77-G-2984 CH (12th Jud. Cir. June 20, 1979) (judgment
order against the fund). The Illinois Department of Registration and Education filed a motion for
rehearing on the amount of attorney's fees awarded. Id. (12th Jud. Cir. July 20, 1979). Subse-
quently, the court adopted the latter interpretation of "actual damages." Id. (12th Jud. Cir. Sept.
4, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-844 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Sept. 28, 1979). The lower court's
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in connection with an act or transaction involving a real estate broker is
$10,000.24 The maximum liability of the fund arising from the activi-
ties of any single broker is limited to $50,000.25
The Illinois Department of Registration and Education 26 is the
statutory agency charged with the maintenance of the recovery fund.
27
The statute provides that the DRE must receive written notice at the
"commencement" of a lawsuit which may result in recovery from the
fund.28 The action against the broker must be initiated within two
years from the accrual of the cause of action.29 After the DRE is noti-
fied of the suit it may enter an appearance,30 or intervene and fully
participate in the action brought against the broker.
3
'
When judgment is entered against a real estate broker the judg-
ment creditor may file, upon the termination of all proceedings in con-
nection with that judgment, a verified claim for payment from the fund
in the court in which judgment was entered. The claimant must show
that he has satisfied certain conditions including affirmations that (1) he
is not a spouse of the debtor; (2) a judgment has been obtained in a
stated amount and is still due; (3) a reasonable search has been made
for the debtor's assets; (4) assets were not found in an amount sufficient
to satisfy the judgment; and, (5) the claimant has diligently pursued his
initial interpretation of the statute allowed unlimited recovery of attorney's fees and overlooked
the legislature's intention to place limits on recovery to ensure the financial integrity of the fund.
See text accompanying notes 24 and 25 infra.
The statute also is vague as to whether attorney's fees and court costs are both included
within the 15% limitation. Although this issue has not been litigated at the appellate level, in
Jones v. Anderson, 62 Il. App. 3d 284, 379 N.E.2d 104 (1978), the appellate court affirmed an
order requiring the Illinois Department of Registration and Education to pay plaintiffs $1 1,543.32
which includzd a $10,000 judgment amount, $1,500 for attorney's fees and $43.32 for court costs.
Id. at 287, 379 N.E.2d at 105.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5716 (1977). See note 155 infra.
25. Id. As of January 1, 1979, this provision mandated the denial of three claims arising from
the activities of the only broker whose $50,000 limit had been reached. Status Report, supra note
21, at 2. See text accompanying notes 156-67 infra.
26. Hereinafter referred to in text and footnotes as the DRE.
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 5716 (1977).
28. Id. § 5718(a). The DRE, on occasion, has disputed whether notice was timely. As of
January 1, 1979, the DRE reported that of 163 cases it had received, notice in 58 of those cases was
received more than 30 days after the cases were filed. Status Report, supra note 21, at 2. Trial
courts have been reluctant to dismiss petitions for recovery on this basis unless the DRE can show
that the delay affected its ability to defend the fund. See, e.g., Harris v. Barnes, No. 76M1-134925
(Cook County Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 1977) (order for payment from the fund granted).
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 5718(a) (1977). The DRE reported that as of January 1, 1979,
it had received notice of six suits out of 163 which were begun more than two years from the
accrual of the cause of action therein. Status Report, supra note 21, at 2.
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11, § 5721 (1977).
3 I. Id. § 5718(a). Seegenerally Ryan v. Bening, 66 Ill. App. 3d 127, 127, 383 N.E.2d 681, 682
(1978).
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remedies against the judgment debtor.32
When the DRE is directed by the court to make payment from the
recovery fund, the department is subrogated to all of the rights of the
judgment creditor as against the judgment debtor. The judgment credi-
tor must assign his entire interest in the judgment to the DRE. Any
amount recovered by the DRE on the assignment of judgment must be
deposited in the recovery fund.33 The failure of a claimant to comply
with the provisions of the recovery fund statute constitutes a waiver of
all rights to reimbursement.3 4
A real estate broker's license is terminated automatically if the
DRE pays any amount from the recovery fund in settlement of a claim
or in satisfaction of a judgment against a broker. 35 The broker is not
eligible to receive a new license until he has repaid, with interest, the
amount disbursed from the fund.36 A discharge of the broker's debts in
bankruptcy does not alter this requirement. 37
The Illinois General Assembly amended the recovery fund statute
in 1978 to allow substituted service of process upon the director of the
DRE in situations where a real estate broker cannot be found to effect
service.38 The substituted service amendment specifies that "[a]ny
judgment obtained after service of process on the Director shall apply
to and be enforceable against the Real Estate Recovery Fund only." '39
This legislation was proposed in the wake of an Illinois appellate court
decision which held that a judgment creditor could not recover from
the fund since personal service had not been obtained at trial over a
broker who had fled Illinois. 40 The appellate court stated that there
was nothing in the original statute creating the recovery fund "to sug-
gest a departure from the principle that personal service is necessary for
the court to acquire [in personam] jurisdiction over the defendant [bro-
32. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11, § 5718(b) (1977).
33. Id. § 5722. As of July i1, 1979, 56 claims had been paid from the fund, including the
payment of seven claims in 1979, in the total amount of $237,985.61. Status Report, supra note 21,
at I (revised through July 11, 1979).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5723 (1977).
35. Id. § 5718(d). See text accompanying notes 42-86 infra. As of January 1, 1979, the
licenses of twenty brokers had been terminated as a result of payments from the fund. Status
Report, supra note 21, at 2.
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5718(d) (1977). One broker has agreed to make restitution to
the fund. Status Report, supra note 21, at 2-3.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 11, § 5718(d) (1977). But see text accompanying notes 87-106 infra.
38. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5718(a) (Supp. 1978).
39. Id Accord, CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-61-303(3) (1978). But see text accompanying notes
75-86 infra, which discusses the DRE's position that this clause does not preclude it from automat-
ically terminating the license of a broker when substituted service is used by a judgment creditor
to effect recovery from the fund.
40. Chiarelli v. Mitchell, 36 Ill. App. 3d 287, 343 N.E.2d 563 (1976).
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ker] .,41
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PENALTIES AND DISABILITIES
IMPOSED UPON REAL ESTATE BROKERS
The various recovery funds share a common purpose-to reim-
burse the public for damages incurred as a result of the wrongful acts
of "unscrupulous or financially unstable brokers or salesmen". 42 How-
ever, due to their regulatory nature, almost all of these funds require
that disciplinary action be taken against the licensee whose activities
are the basis of a claim which results in payment from the fund.43
While the states undoubtedly have the power to sanction licensees, the
statutory disciplinary provisions present problems of constitutional di-
mension.
Due Process and Automatic License Revocation
In Slaughter v. Edwards," the California Court of Appeal consid-
ered an appeal by a defendant real estate broker of an order granting
the judgment creditors' application for payment of a prior judgment
against the defendant broker out of California's real estate recovery
fund. 45 The broker appealed the order because payment from the fund
resulted in the automatic suspension of his license.4 6 None of the perti-
nent statutes provided that the broker be made a party to the proceed-
ing which determined whether the judgment creditor would recover
from the fund.47 The appellate court in Slaughter found that the bro-
ker was an "aggrieved party" who had proper standing to bring the
appeal since his interest in maintaining his license was apparent from
41. Id. at 289, 343 N.E.2d at 565.
42. Chetelat v. District Court, 586 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Colo. 1978). E.g., S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 36-21-55 (1977), which states, in pertinent part:
The state real estate commission is hereby directed to establish and maintain a real estate
recovery fund, which shall be used to provide a source for payment of unsatisfied judg-
ments obtained by persons aggrieved by the acts of a [licensed] broker or salesman.
Some recovery funds also are designed to assist the real estate profession by providing revenue for
education and research purposes. Eg., UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2a-2(2) (1978).
43. Eg., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10475 (West Supp. 1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11,
§ 5718(d) (1977). UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-2a-9 (1978), provides that the Utah Real Estate Division
has the discretion to "revoke, suspend or refuse to renew the license" of the licensee. ALASKA
STAT. §§ 45.85.010-45.85.110 (Supp. 1978), does not mandate that disciplinary action be taken
against the licensee. However, such action may be taken under the general disciplinary powers of
the Alaska Real Estate Commission. 1d. § 45.85.110.
44. Ii Cal. App. 3d 285, 90 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1970).
45. Id. at 288, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47.
46. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10475 (West Supp. 1979).
47. Id. at §§ 10470-10483 (1964 & Supp. 1979). Section 10471 provided only that the real
estate commissioner be served with a copy of a claimant's verified application for recovery.
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the trial court record.48
On its own motion, the California Court of Appeal raised the issue
of the constitutionality of the proceedings.49 The court questioned
whether the real estate broker was deprived of procedural due process
since he was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the post-
trial hearing, despite the fact that his license was suspended automati-
cally when the judgment creditor obtained a court order for payment
from the fund.50 The Slaughter opinion did not mention the basis for
the court's implicit determination that the broker was entitled to the
protections of procedural due process. 5' Rather, the court focused
upon whether the provisions of California's recovery fund comported
with the process that was due the broker.52
The real estate commissioner contended that the broker's constitu-
tional rights were not prejudiced because the broker participated in the
post-trial hearing which resulted in the payout from the fund. The ap-
pellate court found, however, that although the broker testified as a
witness for the commissioner, he did not appear as a party pursuant to
notice. 53
The judgment creditors filed a brief in order to defend the pay-
ment order they received from the lower court. Their argument was
that the revocation of the broker's license resulted from ministerial
rather than judicial or quasi-judicial action. In other words, the credi-
tors contended that the payout order made suspension of the broker's
license mandatory as a matter of law.54 The court compared the instant
situation to the mandatory duty of the commissioner to suspend a bro-
ker when he is convicted of a crime. 55 The Slaughter court noted that
48. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 290-92, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 148-49. The judgment creditors were "neces-
sary parties" to the appeal because the validity of the payment made to them by the California
Commissioner of Real Estate would be in question if the broker was successful in reversing the
order for payment from the fund. Id. at 292, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
49. Id. at 293, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
50. Id.
51. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
outlined a two-part test for determining whether an individual is entitled to procedural due proc-
ess. First, the court must decide whether there has been a deprivation of a liberty interest or a
property interest vested by state law. Id. at 569-72. Second, if such an interest is found, the court
must then decide what process is due. Id. at 569-70 & n.7. The Slaughter court, in its discussion
of standing, stated that "[tihere can be no question that defendant's license is recognized as a
valuable and vested property right." II Cal. App. 3d at 291-92, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
52. Id. at 293, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 294, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 150. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10177 (West Supp. 1979),
provides that a license may be revoked when the licensee is convicted of a felony or a crime that
involves moral turpitude.
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the reason due process is satisfied in such a situation is because the
broker has an opportunity to defend himself at trial and upon convic-
tion of the. crime.5 6 However, the court observed that where an in-
dependent judicial or quasi-judicial determination of facts occurs, a
broker's license may not be suspended or revoked without granting a
hearing to the broker.5 7 The court examined the California statute and
made the following findings:
[Tihe suspension of the license is not made mandatory upon the ren-
dition of the judgment against the licensee.... The court in the
( . . [post-trial] proceeding makes an independent determination as
to whether the judgment is one obtained on the grounds of fraud,
misrepresentation, or deceit with reference to a transaction for which
a real estate license was required. . . . This determination is the
event upon which the licensee's license is automatically suspended.
Yet, the licensee . . is not permitted to show that the claim is one
which may not properly be levied against the Fund.58
The Slaughter court concluded that the defendant broker was de-
nied due process and held that the statutory provision requiring auto-
matic suspension of the broker's license was unconstitutional.5 9 The
California legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide for
notice to licensees and an opportunity to defend at the collateral hear-
ing when a verified application for recovery from the fund is filed. 60
The California Court of Appeal is unique in that no other state
court of review has considered the constitutionality of any aspect of its
state's recovery fund. The recovery fund statutes of many states pro-
vide no opportunity for a licensee to appear at the proceeding which
determines whether recovery from the fund will occur.6 1 Several states
have followed California's lead and now require that the licensee re-
ceive notice and an opportunity to defend himself at the post-trial hear-
ing.62 Other states condition any action taken against a licensee upon a
56. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 294, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
57. Id., 90 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
58. Id. at 295, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
59. Id., 90 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52.
60. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10471, 10473.1 (West Supp. 1979).
61. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-2186 to 32-2193 (1976 & Supp. 1979-1980); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 20-324 (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2921 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 475.481-475.486 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1424 (1979); HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 467-16 to 467-25 (1976 & Supp. 1978); IDAHO CODE § 54-2035 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-
3023 to 58-3033 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 645.841-645.8494 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:15-34
to 45:15-42 (West 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.12 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 59, §§ 858-601 to 858-605 (West Supp. 1978-1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.5-5 (Supp. 1978);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. I13A, art. 6573a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 61-2a-I to 61-2a-12 (1978).
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-304 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34 subd. 10 (West Supp.
1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23.2-06 (1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-21-64 (1977).
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finding of misconduct by the agency in charge of regulating the real
estate profession.63
Under Illinois decisional and statutory law, a real estate broker is
entitled to procedural due process prior to license suspension or revoca-
tion.64 An Illinois appellate court has explained that a person who pos-
sesses "a real estate broker's license is entitled to . . . 'due process of
law [which] requires a definite charge, adequate notice, and a full, fair
and impartial hearing.' "65
Unlike the statute declared unconstitutional in California, the Illi-
nois recovery fund statute entitles the broker to notice from the judg-
ment creditor when an application is made for recovery.66 This
provision affords the broker an opportunity to satisfy the judgment and
avoid a payment from the fund which would have the effect of revok-
ing his license. Also, notice of the post-trial hearing gives the broker a
chance to file a motion to participate in this proceeding, although no
provision is made for this procedure in the recovery fund statute.
67
California's recovery fund statute has provided from its inception
that any judgment obtained against a licensee is prima facie evidence
only, of the fund's liability.68 In Illinois, the grounds underlying a
judgment against a broker, in all likelihood, cannot be attacked at the
post-trial hearing which determines the fund's liability.69 In this re-
spect, the termination of a broker's license is automatic since it is not
based upon an independent determination of the facts underlying the
judgment. It can be argued that the broker receives the process due
him on the merits of his license revocation in an impartial hearing at
the trial establishing his liability to the judgment creditor. Also, when
the DRE makes payment from the fund, it notifies the broker that he
has ten days to show cause why his license should not be terminated.
70
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-1321 (Interim Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. § 324.420(l) (1977);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 217A (1972).
64. Saleson v. Department of Reg. & Educ., 95 I11. App. 2d 104, 117, 237 N.E.2d 822, 828
(1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5733 (1977). See also Ullmen v. Department of Reg. & Educ.,
67 111. App. 3d 519, 385 N.E.2d 58 (1978), and Coles v. Department of Reg. & Educ., 59 11. App.
3d 1046, 376 N.E.2d 269 (1978). In both Ullmen and Coles, the appellate court assumed that a
real estate broker who is faced with license revocation proceedings is entitled to due process.
65. Saleson v. Department of Reg. & Educ., 95 111. App. 2d 104, 117, 237 N.E.2d 822, 828
(1968), quoting Smith v. Department of Reg. & Educ., 412 111. 332, 344, 106 N.E.2d 722, 728
(1952).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5718(b) (1977).
67. The motion might be premised on the theory that the broker is a necessary party to the
proceedings. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 26 (1977).
68. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10473 (West Supp. 1979).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5718(b) (1977). See text accompanying notes 115-54 infra.
70. Letter from Henry Arkin, Technical Advisor for the DRE, to author (Sept. 11, 1979)
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On the other hand, as the California Court of Appeal noted in
Slaughter, the direct effect of a judgment against a licensee is the impo-
sition of monetary damages only. 7' The same holds true for the Illinois
fund. The license of an Illinois broker is not revoked until after his
judgment creditor has been successful in receiving an order for pay-
ment from the fund.72 Recovery from the fund is by no means auto-
matic. If the judgment creditor cannot or will not comply with all of
the provisions of Illinois' fund, his application for recovery will be de-
nied.73 A broker always is entitled to an opportunity for a hearing con-
ducted by the DRE on the issue of license revocation, except when
termination is based upon a payment from the fund.74 From this per-
spective, a trial which establishes only a broker's monetary liability to
another person does not constitute an "impartial hearing" as to
whether there are grounds for revoking the broker's license.
Nevertheless, when a broker receives notice of a trial in which the
plaintiff intends to establish the broker's liability in connection with his
professional activities, he should not be able to ignore the suit and later
claim that due process was denied to him when his license is termi-
nated. The trial provides an opportunity for a full, fair and impartial
hearing where the broker can dispute charges pertaining to his business
practices. One effect of the automatic termination provision is that bro-
kers may choose to defend such actions more often. This result pro-
motes the legislative intent of the recovery fund and the real estate
licensing statute without the sacrifice of a broker's due process rights.
However, the DRE also contends that the termination clause ap-
plies to brokers not served personally, but through substituted service.75
The department maintains that the statutory clause which specifies that
"[any judgment obtained after service of process on the Director shall
apply to and be enforceable against the Real Estate Recovery Fund
only, ' 76 means only that the broker is not liable to the judgment credi-
(letter on file at the Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter cited as DRE Advisor]. The practice
of giving notice to show cause is not required by the recovery fund statute.
71. I1 Cal. App. 3d at 292, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 149. The court noted that a broker might have a
variety of reasons for not contesting a judgment. Id.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5718(d) (1977).
73. 1d. §§ 5718, 5723.
74. Id. §§ 5732, 5733(c). The Slaughter court observed that under California statutory law, a
broker was entitled to a hearing if disciplinary proceedings were brought, except when recovery
from the fund was involved. II Cal. App. 3d at 294-95, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 151.
75. DRE Advisor, supra note 70.
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5718(a) (Supp. 1978). The substituted service provision was
introduced in the Illinois Senate without this clause which was added by a Senate amendment.
The present wording of the clause is the result of an amendatory veto by the Governor which was
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tor for the judgment amount.77 The DRE's interpretation of the statute
is incorrect. When a broker's license is terminated because of a pay-
ment from the fund, he cannot obtain another license until he reim-
burses the fund for the amount paid to the judgment creditor. 78 Yet, if
this provision is enforced against a broker when the substituted service
method is used, the specific intent of the legislature that such a judg-
ment must "apply to and be enforceable against the recovery fund
only" is contravened.
Assuming the DRE is correct in its interpretation of the substituted
service provision, the statute violates constitutional protections of due
process. The broker is entitled to notice of the proceeding which results
in the termination of his license.79 The United States Supreme Court
has held that this notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 80
The recovery fund statute requires the DRE to send a copy of the
substituted process which is served on the director of the DRE to the
broker's last reported address by registered mail.81 While the depart-
ment may notify a broker by registered mail when license revocation
proceedings are initiated, 82 this method is ordinarily an efficient notice-
giving device.8 3 Thus, such notification is "reasonably calculated" to
alert the broker to the revocation proceeding since the broker should
receive the letter of notice when it is directed to his last reported place
of business.
approved by the General Assembly. ILLINOIS FINAL LEGISLATIVE SYNOPSIS & DIGEST, 1977
REG. SESS., S.B. No. 745.
77. DRE Advisor, supra note 70.
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. II, § 5718(d) (1977).
79. Saleson v. Department of Reg. & Educ., 95 111. App. 2d 104, 117, 237 N.E.2d 822, 828
(1968). See also Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1280-81 (1975).
80. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
81. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5718(a) (Supp. 1978). Perhaps this is not a notice requirement,
but rather a check on the plaintiff to determine whether the substituted service order was obtained
properly. If the broker receives the process sent by the DRE and consequently makes an appear-
ance in the case, then the order for substituted service probably should not have been issued. See
text accompanying note 84 infra.
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 5733(c) (1977).
83. Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 591 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 1979). The United States
Constitution does not require that a party receive actual notice of an action. Id. Some suits which
normally require personal service of process to satisfy the notice requirement of due process may
involve circumstances which justify other less effective methods of service. Eg., International
Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 174-78 (2d Cir. 1979). In Vesco, the defendant, who re-
sided outside the United States, hired bodyguards and took other evasive actions to avoid being
served with process. The Second Circuit upheld an order permitting service by registered mail
and by the deposit of the summons and complaint at the defendant's last known residential ad-
dress, as these methods of service were "reasonably calculated to give Vesco actual notice of the
suit." Id. at 178.
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However, an order for substituted service may not be obtained un-
less the plaintiff, in the suit against the broker, persuades the court that
the broker cannot be found to effect personal service. 84 When efforts to
effect personal service have failed, mailing a copy of the substituted
process to the broker's last reported address is unlikely to notify the
broker of the suit.85 The ineffectiveness of this notice device is signifi-
cant because a broker, whose license is revoked automatically, is bur-
dened with the repayment of a judgment debt as a prerequisite to
obtaining another license. Consequently, automatic termination under
the recovery fund statute involves more serious consequences than
under the general revocation proceedings. Therefore, under these cir-
cumstances, due process requires that a better method of notice, such as
personal service of process upon the broker, be used if the broker is to
be subject to the reimbursement requirement.86
Supremacy Clause and Discharge in Bankruptcy
A discharge in bankruptcy does not alter the Illinois recovery fund
requirement that a broker is ineligible to receive another license until
he has repaid with interest the amount disbursed from the recovery
fund on his account. 87 However, the United States Constitution grants
Congress express authority "To establish . . . uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."' 88 The United
States Supreme Court has determined that states may not adopt or en-
force legislation which "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."8 9 Con-
sequently, insofar as the Illinois Real Estate Recovery Fund conflicts
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 5718(a) (Supp. 1978).
85. Cf. Grover v. Franks, 27 111. App. 3d 900, 904, 327 N.E.2d 71, 74 (1975) (whether substi-
tuted service on party's attorney is valid against the party depends on the stage of the litigation).
86. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950); People ex
rel. Loeser v. Loeser, 51 111. 2d 567, 572, 283 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1972); Summers v. Illinois Com-
merce Comm'n, 58 11. App. 3d 933, 936, 374 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (1978); Grover v. Franks, 27 111.
App. 3d 900, 903, 327 N.E.2d 71, 73 (1975).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5718(d) (1977). Accord, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2188F
(1976); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10475 (West Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-304
(1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-324e(f) (West Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 2921(h) (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.484(7) (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-
1424(c)(6) (1979); HAW. REV. STAT. § 467-18(e) (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3028 (1976); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 56, § 217A(d)(5) (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34 subd. 13 (West Supp. 1979);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23.2-09 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.12(E) (Page Supp. 1978):
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.5-5(c)(5) (Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-21-69 (1977); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. tit. 113A, art. 6573a, § 8, pt. 3(f) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); VA. CODE § 54-
7658 (1978).
88. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
89. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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with the purpose of any provision of the federal bankruptcy laws, the
Illinois statute violates the Federal Constitution's supremacy clause90
and to that extent is invalid.9'
In Perez v. Campbell,92 the United States Supreme Court set forth
the principles which are relevant to state statutes such as the one which
provides for the Illinois recovery fund. Perez overruled two previous
Supreme Court decisions,93 and invalidated an Arizona statute which
authorized the suspension of a driver's license and vehicle registration
for nonpayment of a judgment debt resulting from an automobile acci-
dent, even when that debt had been discharged in bankruptcy proceed-
ings.
94
The Perez opinion describes the appropriate analysis for determin-
ing which state statutes are in conflict with congressional bankruptcy
laws: "Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal stat-
ute and hence invalid under the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two-
step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and
then determining the constitutional question whether they are in con-
flict." 95
According to the Perez Court, the purpose of the Arizona statute
was to protect non-negligent parties from loss brought about by
financially irresponsible drivers who either admit liability or are found
negligent in court.96 In contrast, the Court noted that a primary pur-
pose of bankruptcy is to offer a debtor "'a new opportunity in life and
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discour-
agement of pre-existing debt.' ,,97
Arizona's financial responsibility law burdened individuals who
discharged their debts in bankruptcy but were unable to obtain a new
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, provides in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.
91. Lake, Conflict.- The Bankruptcy Act v. State Statutes, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 753, 753
(1977).
92. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
93. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33
(1941). Prior to Perez, a state statute was not in violation of the supremacy clause if the purpose
of the state legislation did not conflict with the underlying policies of the bankruptcy laws. In
Kesler, the Court found that a Utah motor vehicle financial responsibility law was not designed to
promote debt collection, but to enforce a policy against irresponsible driving. 369 U.S. at 174. In
Reitz, the Court found that although a New York motor vehicle financial responsibility law inter-
fered with the effect of bankruptcy proceedings, it was constitutional since the statute was
designed to promote highway safety. 314 U.S. at 37.
94. 402 U.S. at 656.
95. Id. at 644.
96. Id. at 644-48.
97. Id. at 648, quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
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driver's license until they satisfied those discharged debts which were
based upon the operation of a motor vehicle. The Perez Court struck
down the Arizona statute because it was "inconsistent with the control-
ling principle that any state legislation which frustrates the full effec-
tiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause." 98
The principles enunciated in Perez are applicable to all state stat-
utes and governmental regulations which use the bankruptcy of a
debtor as the basis for discriminating against him.99 Congress has ex-
pressed its approval of this application of Perez by codifying the ration-
ale of the case as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.10 °
Consequently, applying the Perez analysis to the Illinois recovery fund
provision in question is at least appropriate, if not mandatory. A bank-
98. 402 U.S. at 652. The Supreme Court of California, in Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal. 3d 305,
525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975), observed:
[T]he Perez opinion made clear that the controlling principle is whether a state statute
interferes with and frustrates a federal statute and not merely whether the former is
designed for some conceivable state purpose. In other words, the existence vel non of a
conflict depends on the elfect of the state statute and cannot be determined merely by a
consideration of its purpose.
Id. at 310, 525 P.2d at 67-68, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 627-28 (emphasis in original).
99. See In re Crisp, 521 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975) (state hospital could not collect debt dis-
charged in bankruptcy proceedings); Handsome v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978)
(state college may not withhold transcript after debt was discharged in bankruptcy proceedings);
Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975) (municipal civil service board
ruling resulting in a police officer's dismissal for having petitioned in bankruptcy held invalid as a
violation of the supremacy clause); Kayetan v. License No. 37589, Class C-61, 116 Ariz. App. 99,
567 P.2d 1228 (1977) (licensing statute in conflict with federal bankruptcy law); Grimes v. Hos-
chler, 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975)
(state may not revoke contractor's license on the sole ground of personal bankruptcy, nor may it
compel the complete satisfaction of discharged debts prior to the reissuance of a license); In re
Loftin, 327 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 1976) (Shreveport fire department policy resulting in the dismis-
sal of a bankrupt fireman held unconstitutional under supremacy clause). Cf. Girardier v. Web-
ster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977) (private college may constitutionally withhold
transcript from bankrupt until debt owed to the college is paid); McLellan v. Mississippi Power &
Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (Perez inapplicable to private action). But see Handsome
v. Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 n.6 (D.N.J. 1978), in which the court takes issue with the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Girardier for drawing a constitutional distinction between state and
private colleges.
100. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549-2657, 2593 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. §§ I-
151326, § 525) (eff. date Oct. 1, 1979). Section 525 provides in pertinent part:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license...
[of] a person that is or has been a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act. . .solely because
such bankrupt or debtor . . .has not paid a debt . . . that was discharged under the
Bankruptcy Act.
The Senate Report states that "[tIhis section permits further development to prohibit actions
by governmental ...organizations that perform licensing functions." S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 81, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5867. However, the
House Report notes that this section "does not prohibit consideration of other factors, such as
future financial responsibility or ability." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 366-67, re-
printed in 11978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6322-23. Cf. In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d
826, 831 (Minn. 1979) (federal law does not preclude bar examiners from evaluating the responsi-
bility of a bankrupt law applicant in satisfying his financial obligations) (decided prior to the
effective date of new bankruptcy act).
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rupt's failure to make repayment of a discharged debt to the Illinois
fund may be the sole basis for his ineligibility to receive another bro-
ker's license.' 0l While the apparent purpose of this requirement is to
promote the reimbursement of the fund by the bankrupt, it frustrates
the bankrupt's ability to obtain a fresh start, as he is not eligible to
work as a licensed broker until the fund is repaid. 0 2
Nevertheless, judgment debts based upon fraud, misrepresentation
or deceit, the grounds for recovery from the Illinois fund, are not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy proceedings. 0 3 The Supreme Court recently
explained the legislative basis for limiting the relief available to a dis-
honest bankrupt: "By seeking discharge, . . . [the debtor] placed the
rectitude of his prior dealings squarely in issue."10 4 Therefore, a bank-
rupt ex-broker who is indebted to the recovery fund would not be enti-
tled to a fresh start. In 1970, however, Congress invested exclusive
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court to determine whether a debt was in
this nondischargeable category. Unless a creditor with notice of the
bankruptcy files a timely application in bankruptcy court "for a deter-
mination of dischargeability . . .the debt shall be discharged."'
0 5
The Illinois recovery fund provision giving no effect to the bro-
ker's discharge is not in compliance with the 1970 congressional
amendment because neither the judgment creditor nor the DRE is re-
quired to contest the discharge in bankruptcy court. The recovery fund
statute conflicts with the federal policy of adjudicating the status of all
alleged fraudulent debts in one forum, the bankruptcy court. Clearly,
this provision is invalid under the supremacy clause of the Federal
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5718(d) (1977).
102. See Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975), overruling Tracy v. Contractors' State Licensing Bd., 63 Cal. 2d 598,
407 P.2d 865, 47 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1965). Grimes held, inter alia, that a state may not compel the
satisfaction of dicharged debts prior to the reissuance of a contractor's license; accord, Kayeton v.
License No. 37589, Class C-61, 116 Ariz. App. 99, 567 P.2d 1228 (1977). The author of Note,
Supremacy of the Bankruptcy Act: The New Standard of Perez v. Campbell, 40 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 764, 773-74 (1972), predicted that the statute held unconstitutional in Grimes could be chal-
lenged successfully.
103. These debts are not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (relevant
section to be codified at II U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)) nor under the superseded section, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35(a)(2) (1976). The fiduciary exception to discharge in bankruptcy (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(4)) (superseding 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(4) (1976)), usually has been held not to include bro-
kers. See Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 896, 897 (1955).
104. Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2208 (1979).
105. Pub. L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 992 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(2) (1976)). See In re God-
frey, 472 F. Supp. 364, 370 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (dicta); H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4156, 4156-57. This requirement is included in
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and will be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(c). See generally
Brown v. Felsen, 99 S. Ct. 2205, 2208-12 (1979); Stevenson v. Baker, 18 I11. App. 3d 542, 545, 310
N.E.2d 58, 61 (1974).
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Constitution. 106
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE ILLINOIS RECOVERY FUND STATUTE
The nature and function of the proceedings which determine the
liability of the various recovery funds have been the subject of several
state appellate court decisions. 07 A number of issues may need to be
resolved in the course of these proceedings including: whether the
judgment obtained against a real estate licensee is based upon his activ-
ities in his professional capacity; 08 whether the claimant is in the class
protected by the statute; 109 whether the cause of action accrued within a
time specified by statute;" 0 whether substituted service on behalf of the
licensee is proper;"I' whether a claimant exercised due diligence in ob-
taining recovery from the licensee;" 12 whether a claimant is limited to
recovery of compensatory damages; 13 and, whether a claimant is enti-
tled to recover interest on the judgment from the fund.' 14
106. This conclusion is applicable to other real estate recovery funds with similar discharge in
bankruptcy provisions. See note 87 supra.
107. Real Estate Bd. v. Dalessandro, 17 Ariz. App. 181, 496 P.2d 607 (1972); Arizona Real
Estate Dept. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 9 Ariz. App. 54, 449 P.2d 71 (1968); State v.
Griswold, 8 Ariz. App. 361, 446 P.2d 467 (1968); State exrel. Talley v. Jones, 8 Ariz. App. 173, 444
P.2d 730 (1968); Wolff v. Hoaglund, II Cal. App. 3d 227, 89 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1970); Jones v.
Anderson, 62 111. App. 3d 284, 379 N.E. 2d 104 (1978); Carter v. Johnson, 55 Ohio App. 2d 157,
380 N.E.2d 758 (1978).
108. Von Thaden v. Arizona State Real Estate Comm'r, 604 P.2d 658 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979);
Martin v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 26 Ariz. App. 239, 547 P.2d 510 (1976); Arizona Real Estate
Dept. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 9 Ariz. App. 361, 449 P.2d 71 (1968); Robinson v.
Murphy, 96 Cal. App. 3d 763, 158 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (1979); In Re Marriage of Powers, 96 Cal.
App. 3d 440, 158 Cal. Rptr. 92, 96 (1979); McGaughey v. Fox, 94 Cal. App. 3d 645, 649, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 593, 595 (1979); Lemler v. Real Estate Comm'n, 38 Colo. App. 489, 558 P.2d 591 (1976).
109. In re Marriage of Powers, 96 Cal. App. 3d 440, 158 Cal. Rptr. 92, 95 (1979) (discussion of
the legislative exclusion of a licensee's spouse); Middelsteadt v. Karpe, 52 Cal. App. 3d 297, 124
Cal. Rptr. 840 (1975) (real estate broker was not entitled although saleswoman obtained broker's
commission by fraudulent means).
110. Arizona Real Estate Dept. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 14 Ariz. App. 509, 484
P.2d 662 (1971); Jones v. Anderson, 62 Il. App. 3d 284, 379 N.E.2d 104 (1978) Fritsch v. Texas
Real Estate Comm'n, 587 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979). Cf. Hammer v. Real Estate
Comm'n, 576 P.2d 191 (Colo. App. 1978) (statute construed part of general licensing statute but
identical to statute applicable to the recovery fund).
11l. Chetelat v. District Court, 586 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1978); Chiarelli v. Mitchell, 36 111. App.
3d 287, 343 N.E.2d 563 (1976).
112. State ex rel. Talley v. McAvoy, 14 Ariz. App. 229, 482 P.2d 478 (1971); Antonio v.
Hempel, 71 Cal. App. 3d 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977); Middelsteadt v. Karpe, 52 Cal. App. 3d
297, 124 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1975); Buonincontro v. Kloppenborg, 61 111. App. 3d 1041, 378 N.E.2d
635 (1978).
113. State v. Griswold, 8 Ariz. App. 361, 446 P.2d 467 (1968); Nordahl v. Franzalia, 48 Cal.
App. 3d 657, 121 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1975); Circle Oak Sales Co. v. Real Estate Comm'r, 16 Cal. App.
3d 682, 94 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1971); Application of Jones, 310 Minn. 500, 246 N.W.2d 578 (1976).
114. Nordahl v. Franzalia, 48 Cal. App. 3d 657, 121 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1975); Application of
Jones, 310 Minn. 500, 246 N.W.2d 578 (1976).
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Proceedings Which Determine Recovery from the Fund
When a valid judgment is recovered in Illinois against a licensed
real estate broker, the judgment creditor may file a verified petition for
recovery from the fund in the court in which judgment was entered.
The petition is then considered in a "summary manner."" t5 This pro-
ceeding affords the DRE an opportunity to challenge defective claims.
In Jones v. Anderson," 6 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District decided what type of hearing is necessary to determine the va-
lidity of a claim for recovery from the fund." 17 The plaintiffs in Jones
instituted an action against a licensed real estate broker in which they
alleged that the broker had fraudulently converted a deposit which
they had given him toward the purchase of real estate." 8 The plain-
tiffs' counsel sent a copy of their complaint to the DRE when the suit
was filed, but the DRE did not intervene at trial."*9 The plaintiffs re-
covered a judgment against the broker, but were unsuccessful in their
efforts to collect on the judgment. The plaintiffs next petitioned the
court for an order permitting payment from the Illinois Real Estate
Recovery Fund. 20
In response to the verified petition, the DRE stated that because
the recovery fund is an indemnification fund, unknown at common
law, a petitioner must plead and prove that he satisfies all requirements
established by the legislature.' 2 1 The DRE contended inter alia that the
plaintiffs had not proven that the fraud occurred on or after January 1,
1974, as required by the statute. 122 Although the plaintiffs pleaded that
the fraud was discovered in February, 1974, when a demand was made
for the return of the deposit, the DRE maintained that it was just as
likely that the fraud occurred when the money was deposited with the
broker prior to January 1, 1974.123 The lower court rejected the DRE's
argumentand found that the plaintiffs' petition was sufficient to show
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Iii, § 5718(b) (1977).
116. 62 Ill. App. 3d 284, 379 N.E.2d 104 (1978).
117. Id. at 285, 379 N.E.2d at 104.
118. ld. at 286, 379 N.E.2d at 105.
119. Id. The DRE has hesitated to exercise its intervention rights fully. This may be due, in
part, to the department's reluctance to leave an impression that it is defending the interests of
"crooked" brokers to the detriment of those persons injured by the wrongful conduct of such
brokers. As of January 1, 1979, the DRE had intervened in 26 of the 163 cases it had received
notice of. Status Report, supra note 21, at 2.
120. 62 Ill. App. 3d at 286, 379 N.E.2d at 105.
121. Id See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Il, §§ 5716, 5718 (1977).
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 5718(b) (1977). The DRE also contended that notice to the
DRE of the suit against the broker was defective. Id. § 5718(a). This defense, however, was not
pursued on appeal. 62 I11. App. 3d at 287, 379 N.E.2d at 105.
123. Id.
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that the fraud occurred in February, 1974.124 Consequently, the DRE
appealed the court's order directing payment from the fund. 25
The appellate court in Jones rejected the DRE's contention that it
was entitled to a "fair hearing" on the question of whether the plaintiffs
had satisfied the requirements of the statute. 26 Jones held that the
lower court was correct in proceeding in a "summary fashion" after the
DRE had failed to introduce any "pleadings, affidavits or exhibits...
which raised any material issue regarding the plaintiffs' compliance
with statutory requirements." 27
The Jones decision would appear to produce more intervention by
the DRE since in most cases this is the only method by which material
facts can be ascertained by the DRE to later contest the verified claim
for recovery from the fund. However, the court did not address the
issue of whether the DRE must intervene and litigate issues which are
immaterial in a determination of the fund's liability. No Illinois court
of review has considered this matter. Since the Illinois recovery fund is
patterned after the Arizona fund, 28 a survey of relevant Arizona law is
helpful.
The Arizona Court of Appeals has examined the function of the
post-trial hearing on several occasions. 129 The court indicated at one
point that the Arizona Real Estate Board should intervene at trial if it
wished to contest any issue at the subsequent hearing. 130 Upon further
reflection, the court held, in Arizona Real Estate Department v. Arizona
124. Id., 379 N.E.2d at 105-06.
125. Id., 379 N.E.2d at 106.
126. Id. at 288-89, 379 N.E.2d at 106-07.
127. Id. at 288, 379 N.E.2d at 106-07.
128. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5718 (1977 & Supp. 1978) with ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-2188 (1976 & Supp. 1978-1979). Portions of the Illinois statute are copied word for
word from the Arizona statute. The only significant difference between the two statutory provi-
sions is the 1978 Illinois amendment which allows for substituted service of process if the broker
cannot be found to effect personal service of process. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11l, § 5718(a) (Supp.
1978). With this exception, a comparison of the two statutes is useful.
129. Real Estate Bd. v. Dalessandro, 17 Ariz. App. 181, 496 P.2d 607 (1972); Arizona Real
Estate Dept. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 9 Ariz. App. 54, 449 P.2d 71 (1968); State v.
Griswold, 8 Ariz. App. 361, 446 P.2d 467 (1968); State exrel. Talley v. Jones, 8 Ariz. App. 173, 444
P.2d 730 (1968).
130. State ex rel. Talley v. Jones, 8 Ariz. App. 173, 444 P.2d 730, 732 (1968) (dicta). The real
estate board intervened at trial and defended unsuccessfully on the ground that the defendants'
wrongful activities occurred prior to the effective date of the recovery fund statute. Id. at 174, 444
P.2d at 73 I. The appellate court held that the commissioner's failure to appeal the decision of the
trial court estopped the state from reasserting the same contention at the post-trial hearing. Id. at
175, 444 P.2d at 732. The decision may have been influenced by the court's sympathy for the
plaintiff's plight. The court described her as "an elderly widow [who] decided to invest her life's
savings in real estate mortgages" which were never obtained by the defendants. Id. at 173, 444
P.2d at 730.
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Land Title & Trust Co., 131 that the real estate board was not required to
intervene in order to contest issues which only concerned recovery from
the fund. 132
In Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., the Arizona Real Estate Board
received notice of the civil action against the broker in accordance with
the statute, but it did not exercise its statutory right to intervene. 133 Af-
ter the plaintiff obtained a default judgment against the broker, an ap-
plication was made to the court for an order that the Arizona Real
Estate Board pay $10,000 from the fund in partial satisfaction of the
judgment. 134 The order was granted and the board appealed on the
basis of inter alia whether the acts upon which the judgment was based
occurred on or after July 1, 1964.135
The plaintiff contended that the real estate board, by failing to in-
tervene in the original action against the broker, was precluded from
raising this defense at the hearing. 136 The Arizona Court of Appeals
assessed the merits of plaintiffs argument by examining the legislative
history of the recovery fund statute. Specifically, the court determined
the result intended by the legislature when the real estate board exer-
cised, or failed to exercise, its statutory right to intervene.137 The court
explained that an intervenor takes a case as he finds it, and is not per-
mitted to enlarge the scope of the proceedings or raise new issues which
might delay or complicate the matter. 38 The appellate court stated
that the language in the statute to the effect that "[t]he court shall pro-
ceed. . . in a summary manner" did not mean that issues involving the
liability of the fund must be included at trial. 139 Nor did the legislature
intend to diminish the rights of the parties involved according to the
court, but rather it attempted to speed the proceedings. 40 However, by
specifying that the real estate commissioner must be notified at the
commencement of the principal action, the court found that this action
131. 9 Ariz. App. 54, 449 P.2d 71 (1968).
132. Id. at 58, 449 P.2d at 75.
133. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2188(A) (1976).
134. 9 Ariz. App. at 56-57, 449 P.2d at 73-74.
135. Id. at 57, 449 P.2d at 74. The Arizona recovery fund is inapplicable to judgments based
upon actions of licensees that occurred prior to July 1, 1964. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2188(B)
(1976).
136. 9 Ariz. App. at 57, 449 P.2d at 74.
137. Id. at 57-58, 449 P.2d at 74-75.
138. Id. at 58, 449 P.2d at 75.
139. Id. (construing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2188(C) (1976)). The court stated that the
"term 'summary manner' means only that the court proceed without delay or formality in a short,
concise, and immediate proceeding." 9 Ariz. App. at 58, 449 P.2d at 75.
140. Id.
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should bind the fund in some way. 141
Consequently, the Arizona Court of Appeals held in Arizona Land
Title & Trust Co. that the real estate board may not litigate the amount
and fact of the broker's liability if the board fails to intervene or if it
intervenes and is unsuccessful in the defense asserted. 142 In the instant
case, the board could raise the issue of when the broker's acts occurred
because it was not attacking the propriety of the judgment. Rather, the
board questioned whether the judgment obtained was one which could
be satisfied by the fund. 143 The court concluded that the plaintiff had
not met its burden of establishing that the broker's act occurred on or
after July 1, 1964, and reversed the lower court's decision.' 44 The case
was remanded because the plaintiff had not been given an opportunity
in the lower court to present evidence as to the date of the broker's
act. 145
The holding in Arizona Land Title & Trust Co. delineates issues
which will have a binding effect on the Arizona fund at trial. By limit-
ing these issues to the amount and fact of the broker's liability, the
Arizona Court of Appeals narrowed the field of cases in which inter-
vention need occur. In contrast, Jones v. Anderson 46 provides the
DRE with little guidance as to what issues it must litigate at trial. 147
The situations in which the DRE is required to intervene to protect
the interests of others should be limited as much as possible. Other-
wise, intervention may occur in instances where no petition for recov-
ery is asserted. 148 A claim for recovery from the fund will not be
brought if the lawsuit is settled, the defendant broker successfully de-
fends the suit, or the broker fully satisfies a judgment against him. Un-
141. Id. at 58-59, 449 P.2d at 75-76.
142. Id. at 59, 449 P.2d at 76.
143. Id. at 58, 449 P.2d at 75. The court did "not believe that this statute, permitting interven-
tion, mandates that . . . issues, completely collateral to that plenary action, be injected into it."
Id.
144. Id. at 61, 449 P.2d at 78.
145. Id. Apparently, the trial court judge relied on State ex rel. Talley v. Jones, 8 Ariz. App.
173, 444 P.2d 730 (1968), discussed at note 130 supra. On remand, the lower court granted judg-
ment to the plaintiff for $10,000 which was appealed by the commissioner. The appellate court
reversed the lower court's finding that the fraud occurred after July I, 1964, on the grounds that
sufficient weight was not given to the broker's deposition which tended to show that the judgment
was based on activities which occurred prior to that date. Arizona Real Estate Dept. v. Arizona
Land Title & Trust Co., 14 Ariz. App. 509, 511, 484 P.2d 662, 664 (1971).
146. 62 111. App. 3d 284, 379 N.E.2d 104 (1978).
147. See text accompanying notes 116-27 supra.
148. See Duty, supra note 6, at 16, where the author observed:
[Thel 'right to intervene' has placed a heavy burden upon the Arizona Real Estate
Board. It has caused the board to be faced with the dilemma of intervening in many
actions, which would never result in collection from the fund, or in the alternative, al-
lowing actions to go by default, with resulting fund liability in large part pre-determined.
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productive intervention wastes the resources of the DRE. Its efforts
should be focused upon the cases which will result in claims against the
fund. Moreover, intervention may complicate the broker's trial should
the DRE litigate issues pertaining to the liability of the fund which are
irrelevant to the establishment of the broker's liability to the plain-
tiff. 149
The Illinois recovery fund statute follows its Arizona counterpart
and empowers the DRE "to defend the action [against the broker], or
take whatever other action it deems appropriate on behalf and in the
name of the defendant." 50 A liberal interpretation of the quoted lan-
guage would permit the DRE to pursue issues irrelevant to the estab-
lishment of the broker's liability at trial. However, the Illinois Civil
Practice Act' 5' provides that the court may preclude a party that inter-
venes as a matter of right from raising new issues or interfering with
the litigation. 52 Therefore, the holding in Arizona Land Title & Trust
Co. should be given effect in any case where the plaintiffs claim can be
enforced against the broker.
The applicability of this case is limited by the 1978 Illinois substi-
tuted service amendment. 53 When substituted service is used the issue
of a broker's culpability is relevant only to whether the plaintiff will
recover from the fund because any judgment obtained against the bro-
ker is enforceable as to the recovery fund only. 154 In such cases there is
no danger of complicating the proceedings by litigating issues pertain-
ing only to the fund's liability.
Distribution of Funds Wen Broker's Maximum Liability is Exceeded
The Illinois General Assembly limited the maximum payment
from the recovery fund in connection with a single "act, representation,
transaction, or conduct" involving a real estate broker to $10,000.'55
149. Eg., whether notice to the DRE of the suit was timely, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I l, § 57 18(a)
(1977), or whether plaintiffs cause of action against a broker is based upon grounds which makes
the judgment eligible for reimbursement from the fund. Id. § 5716.
150. Id. § 5721. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2191 (1976).
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 1-100 (1977).
152. Id. § 26.1(6).
153. Id. ch. Ill, § 5718(a) (Supp. 1978).
154. ld.
155. Id. § 5716 (1977). See Fox v. Prime Ventures, Ltd., 86 Cal. App. 3d 333, 150 Cal. Rptr.
202 (1978), for a discussion of the equivalent California provision, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 10471 (West Supp. 1979). See also Dombalian v. Fox, 88 Cal. App. 3d 763, 152 Cal. Rptr. 86
(1979) (series of fraudulent acts were part of same transaction). Almost all of the recovery fund
statutes place a maximum limit on the amount of recovery per transaction involved. Eg., GA.
CODE ANN § 84-1424(a) (1979) ($10,000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34 subd. 7 (West Supp. 1979)
($20,000). However, MD. CODE art. 56, § 217A (1972 & Supp. 1978), imposes no maximum recov-
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The statute provides that this amount should be shared equitably
among those entitled to a portion of the judgment. The legislature rec-
ognized the possibility that the activities of a few brokers might result
in numerous claims which could overwhelm the resources of the fund.
Consequently, the liability of the fund for the activities of a single bro-
ker is limited to $50,000. The statute does not state how this latter
amount should be divided among a broker's judgment creditors. 56
No Illinois court of appeal has reviewed a case in which the divi-
sion of the $50,000 maximum amount was in controversy, although a
circuit court addressed this problem in Department of Registration &
Education v. Martino.'57 In Martino, claims against the fund arising
out of the activities of a real estate broker exceeded the $50,000 limit.
The DRE filed an interpleader action in which unknown claimants
were served by publication. 5 8 Two judgment creditors had already ob-
tained orders from the circuit court authorizing recovery from the fund.
The DRE urged the court to rescind these orders and distribute the
available money on a pro rata basis. 159
Those judgment creditors who received orders from the circuit
court for payment from the fund, or stood to recover if the funds avail-
able were distributed on a "first come first served" basis, filed motions
and briefs objecting to the DRE's proposal. 160 These creditors con-
tended that Illinois' lawmakers were aware of other state statutes which
authorized real estate recovery funds. 161 If the legislature intended the
limited funds to be distributed on a pro rata basis, the creditors rea-
soned, it could have provided for that method as had the legislatures of
cry restriction. A bill was introduced in the Maryland Senate in order to place a limit on recovery
of $25,000 per transaction, but the bill was not enacted despite the endorsement of the Maryland
Real Estate Commission. MD. S. No. 274 (1979).
156. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11, § 5716 (1977). This section provides, in pertinent part:
The maximum liability against such Fund arising out of any one act shall be as
provided in this Section and the judgment order shall spread the award equitably among
all co-owners or otherwise aggrieved persons, if any. The maximum liability against
such Fund arising out of the activities of any single broker . . . shall be the sum of
$50,000.
Most recovery fund statutes place a ceiling on the maximum liability of the fund for the acts
of a single licensee. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 84-1424(a)(2) (1979) ($20,000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
59, § 858-604C (West Supp. 1978-1979) ($50,000). But see, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 217A
(1972 & Supp. 1978) (no maximum restriction per licensee).
157. No. 77 L. 714 (18th Jud. Cir. Mar. 8, 1978) (final order).
158. Id. (18th Jud. Cir. Dec. 23, 1977) (interim order).
159. Complaint of DRE at 8, Department of Reg. & Educ. v. Martino, No. 77 L. 714 (18th
Jud. Cir. Mar. 8, 1978).
160. E.g., Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Department of
Reg. & Educ. v. Martino, No. 77 L. 714 (18th Jud. Cir. Mar. 8, 1978).
161. Id. at 6-8.
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other states. 162
The circuit court in Martino refused to rescind the orders which it
already had granted for payment from the fund. The court held that in
the absence of specific statutory language, claims should be paid from
the remaining funds "in the order that the original verified claims for
recovery from the Real Estate Recovery Fund were filed."' 163 The cir-
cuit court premised its order on another provision of the recovery fund
statute 64 which specifies that such an order of payment is to be fol-
lowed in the event that the amount deposited in the recovery fund is
insufficient to satisfy all court approved claims. 165
The circuit court's reliance on this section is misplaced. In draft-
ing the section, the legislature assumed any shortage of funds would be
temporary, since the recovery fund statute provides for an additional
license assessment if the assets of the recovery fund fall below a speci-
fied amount.' 66 However, in Martino, the circuit court's order, in effect,
eliminated all possibility of recovery from the fund for some of the
broker's judgment creditors, except in the unlikely event that the bro-
ker pays back a portion of the $50,000 expended on his behalf. 167
The chief advantage of the method of distribution set forth in Mar-
tino is its simplicity of administration. The priority of an order for
recovery from the fund is determined by the date that the verified claim
was filed. By comparison, problems would arise if the measuring de-
vice was the accrual of the cause of action against the broker. The
timing of this event is often difficult to establish, 168 and certainly not as
precise as a time stamp on a pleading. However, the result in Martino
is not necessarily an equitable one. A judgment creditor who delays
petitioning the fund with the intention of collecting directly from the
broker will not receive any reimbursement if more than $50,000 in
claims already have been awarded from the fund. A meritorious claim
162. Id. at 8. The following statutes provide for a pro rata method of distribution when the
maximum amount for a single broker is exceeded: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10474.5 (West
Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-302(2) (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34 subd. 12(b)
(west 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 645.848 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23.2-08 (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4735.12(D) (Page Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 54-765.5C (1978).
163. No. 77 L. 714 (18th Jud. Cir. Mar. 8, 1978) (final order).
164. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 5718(e) (1977).
165. No. 77 L. 714 (18th Jud. Cir. Feb. 24, 1978) (interim order).
166. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 5717 (1977).
167. As of January i, 1979, only one broker had agreed to make restitution to the fund. Status
Report, supra note 21, at 2-3.
168. See Arizona Real Estate Dept. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 14 Ariz. App. 509, 484
P.2d 662 (1971).
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may go uncompensated simply because the judgment creditor did not
file his petition as soon as others were filed.
California amended its recovery fund in 1967, authorizing the ju-
diciary to distribute the maximum amount available for the activities of
a real estate licensee on a pro rata basis to all aggrieved parties or "as
the court deems equitable."'' 69 Subsequently, the California Court of
Appeal examined this provision in Shirai v. D'Orazi.170 The plaintiffs
in Shirai obtained a judgment against the defendant real estate broker
but were unsuccessful in their attempts to recover the amount of the
judgment from the broker. The plaintiffs applied for and received an
order directing the California Real Estate Commissioner to pay the
judgment amount from the recovery fund. 17 1
Subsequently, the commissioner filed a petition alleging that he
had learned of other parties who were asserting claims against the fund
as a result of the defendant broker's activities. This petition named
three additional claimants as parties in the action. The commissioner
requested a superseding order to vacate the order for full payment to
the plaintiffs from the fund, grant the commissioner's petition to pro-
rate, direct unknown claimants to file their claims with the court and
grant publication of notice.' 72 The trial judge ordered publication of
notice to all claimants to file their applications, but refused to vacate
the earlier court order of payment on behalf of the plaintiffs. 73
Although the trial court held that the order for payment from the
fund was final and could not be upset by a later order altering the pay-
ment to a pro rata share, 74 the California Court of Appeal stated that
such reasoning was "but an assertion of the priority of judgment or
order which is specifically proscribed by the very legislation under
which the plaintiffs seek to recover."' 175 The appellate court reversed
and remanded with instructions to the trial court to determine the va-
lidity of the claims filed following the published notice and to direct
proportionate sharing by all qualified claimants, including the plain-
169. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10474.5 (West Supp. 1979).
170. 57 Cal. App. 3d 276, 127 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1976).
171. Id. at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. 551.
172. Id. at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51.
173. Id., 127 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
174. Id.
175. Id. The California statute states in pertinent part:
Distribution of such moneys shall be among the persons entitled. . . without regard to
the order of priority in which their respective judgments may have been obtained or their
claims have been filed.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10474.5 (West Supp. 1979).
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tiffs, in the amount available from the fund. 176
The California Court of Appeal in Shirai criticized the pro rata
provision of the recovery fund. The court noted that the statute failed
to require publication of notice to prospective claimants upon the filing
of a claim, or to specify a cut-off date for filing of claims. 177 While the
statutory reference to "prospective claimants"178 indicated to the court
that the legislature contemplated the consideration of claims which had
not been filed when the first action was brought, the court urged that
the legislature consider the enactment of clarifying amendments. 179
A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING THE ILLINOIS
REAL ESTATE RECOVERY FUND
Distribution of Limited Funds
When a limited amount of money must be divided in some man-
ner among numerous claimants in a real estate recovery fund action,
one solution to the problems created is simply to remove the limitation.
In fact, several recovery fund statutes place no ceiling on the maximum
amount which may be recovered by the public as a result of the activi-
ties of a single licensee. 80
This approach has two clear advantages. First, all of the licensee's
claimants would be treated equally, as is the case when a pro rata
method is used to divide limited funds. However, without a limitation
on the fund's liability for the activities of one licensee, it is unnecessary
for the trial court to undertake the difficult task of determining the
number of claimants entitled to recovery, or the pro rata share of funds
that each one should receive. Second, a creditor who possesses a judg-
ment against a licensee having many other outstanding judgments en-
tered against him, may suffer as severe a financial injury as another
creditor who possesses the only judgment arising from the activities of
a more "honest" licensee.
Nonetheless, the fear remains that one licensee may generate so
many claims that the solvency of the recovery fund would be under-
176. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 281, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
177. Id. at 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
178. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10474.5 (West Supp. 1979).
179. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 280-81, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 552. The Virginia recovery fund pro rata
provision was designed to solve the problems noted by the Shirai court. See VA. CODE § 54-
765.5C (1978).
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-324 (West Supp. 1979) (eff. date Oct. i, 1969); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 24, § 2921 (Supp. 1978) (eff. date July 11, 1975); MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 217A (1972 &
Supp. 1979) (eff. date July 1, 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:15-34 to 45:15-42 (West 1978) (eff. date
Feb. 1, 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.5-5 (Supp. 1978) (eff. date May 11, 1978).
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mined. No broker has generated enough claims to imperil the financial
soundness of the Illinois fund.' 8 1 Under ordinary circumstances, the
DRE should know of such a broker in time to institute license revoca-
tion proceedings before numerous cases arise. However, claims may
arise almost simultaneously because the injurious activities of a broker
often occur in a brief period of time. 182
The majority of recovery fund statutes which place no ceiling on
the maximum liability for one licensee have been in effect for less than
five years. 83 In fact, one of these funds is experiencing financial diffi-
culties.' 84 The Illinois General Assembly should defer any action
which would eliminate the limitation until the legislature can assess the
financial stability of other recovery funds which have no such limita-
tion. Nevertheless, the legislature should take notice of the fact that the
balance in the Illinois fund has risen each year of its existence and
currently amounts to over $1,000,000.185 With such assets the fund
should be able to reimburse claims against brokers whose $50,000 limit
has been exceeded without threatening the fund's solvency.
For this reason, the Illinois General Assembly should suspend the
maximum liability of the fund for the acts of a single broker provided
that at the end of the previous calendar year the balance in the fund
was greater than an amount specified by the legislature. This minimum
balance would be determined by the legislature's estimate of the funds
needed to pay claims totaling less than $50,000 per broker, without as-
sessing licensees an additional fee. 186 Should the balance in the recov-
181. As of January 1, 1979, claims against the fund exceeded the $50,000 limitation per broker
for only one broker. Status Report, supra note 21, at 2. Three claims were denied on this basis
after publication was made to alert all potential claimants that the limitation had been exceeded.
Id See text accompanying notes 157-65 supra. In retrospect, if these claimants had been allowed
to pursue their claims the fund would not have been threatened.
182. One broker accumulated numerous earnest money deposits before converting the funds
for his own use. See Pacelli v. Kloppenberg, 65 I11. App. 3d 150, 382 N.E.2d 570 (1978); Buonin-
contro v. Kloppenborg, 61 111. App. 3d 1041, 378 N.E.2d 635 (1978).
183. See note 180 supra.
184. The Maryland Real Estate Guaranty Fund, MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 217A (1972 &
Supp. 1979), is in financial danger because claims resulting from the acts of one licensee threaten
to overwhelm the resources of the fund. See Letter from Pauline Masters, Assistant Director
Maryland Real Estate Comm'n, to author (August 14, 1979) (this letter is on file at the Chicago-
Kent Law Review). This problem has been exacerbated because there is no maximum limit per
transaction on the amount which may be awarded from the Maryland fund. See note 155 supra.
185. Status Report, supra note 21, at 3.
186. The recovery fund statute provides for an additional payment of $10 when a broker re-
news his license ($5 for a salesman) if the balance in the fund is less than $150,000 on December
31, of any year. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11, § 5717 (1977). A minimum balance of $500,000, for
example, would probably result in the desired outcome of allowing all claims without requiring an
additional renewal payment. As of January 1, 1979, the DRE estimated that the "projected liabil-
ity" of all outstanding claims against the fund was $461,699.96 although the balance in the fund as
of that date was $1,008,074.65. Subtracting the "projected liability" of the fund from the total
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ery fund fall below this amount on December 31 of any year, the
$50,000 limit would be reactivated until the balance in the fund ex-
ceeded this amount at the close of a subsequent year. The DRE would
notify the court if the $50,000 limit was in effect.
This proposal is a compromise between statutes which do not
place a limitation on the recovery fund's liability and statutes which
disburse funds on a pro rata basis when such a limit is exceeded. If the
present trend of increased Illinois recovery fund assets continues, the
proposed maximum liability provision would not be activated. 8 7
Should the amount deposited in the fund happen to fall below the
amount decided by the legislature on December 31, the limitation pro-
vision might preclude some claims if funds are distributed by the court
on a first-come, first-served basis.' 88 Although a statutory pro rata
method of distribution would be more equitable, designing a workable
plan is a complicated task.189 Legislative efforts would be more pro-
ductive if directed towards a reduction of the situations in which the
$50,000 limitation is applicable, while ensuring that the financial integ-
rity of the recovery fund is not compromised.
Proceedings Which Determine Recovery from the Fund
The statutory right of persons with legitimate claims to compensa-
tion from the fund must be weighed against the responsibility of the
DRE to manage the fund effectively. '9 Several states allow the real
estate licensing agency to question the validity of a judgment obtained
against a licensee at the post-trial hearing, but make no provision for
the agency to intervene at trial. 19 The recovery funds of these states
balance, $546,374.69 would remain in the fund. This crude calculation does not take into account
new claims that will be filed in the future. On the other hand, it also does not take into account
the income that the fund receives each year in the form of licensing fees and interest accrued on
deposits in the fund. For example, in fiscal year (July I-June 30) 1978, the fund received
$163,740.00 in licensing fees from new brokers and $54,018.76 in interest. See Status Report,
supra note 21, at 1, 3.
187. But see Status Report, supra note 21, at 3. Payments from the fund during the first six
months of fiscal year (July I-June 30) 1979, almost equaled the amount paid from the fund during
all of fiscal year 1978. This situation may be due to the likelihood that attorneys are now more
familiar with the recovery fund remedy. However, during the first six months of fiscal year 1979,
the income of the recovery fund remained greater than the amount paid to claimants. Id.
188. See Department of Reg. & Educ. v. Martino, No. 77 L. 714 (18th Jud. Cir. Mar. 8, 1978),
discussed in text accompanying notes 157-68 supra.
189. See generally Shirai v. D'Orazi, 57 Cal. App. 3d 276, 127 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1976). But see
VA. CODE § 54-765.5C (1978), which may prove to be a feasible pro rata provision.
190. See REVIEW OF FLORIDA REAL ESTATE LAW, supra note 3, at 35-36.
191. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10470-10483 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 54-
2035 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34 (West Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-23.2-01 to 43-
32.2-13 (1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.12 (Page Supp. 1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§§ 36-21-55 to 36-21-71 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-2a-I to 61-2a-12 (1978).
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require less administration on the part of the licensing agency since it
must become involved only when a claim is filed for indemnification.
In Illinois, the DRE is involved more often because intervention may
occur in situations which will not result in a claim for recovery. 192
The Illinois fund is intended to be used as a remedy of last re-
sort, 19 3 but it should be a genuine one. The Illinois statute protects a
claimant from having to litigate the broker's liability a second time in
the post-trial hearing. In contrast, the recovery fund statutes which do
not grant the licensing agency the right of intervention, in effect require
a claimant to litigate some issues twice. 194 Intervention of the DRE in
cases that ultimately will not lead to a claim for recovery are justified
by the fact that the path to reimbursement is less complicated for a
party that does file a claim.
However, the Illinois General Assembly should specify which is-
sues decided at the licensee's trial will have a binding effect on the fund
at the post-trial hearing. The best approach would be a codification of
the rule of law announced by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Arizona
Real Estate Department v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co.: 195
[Tihe binding effect of the. . . action [against the broker] upon the
liability of the compensation fund will be limited to the fact and the
amount of the broker's liability, but not as to whether the claim giv-
ing rise to that liability is one falling within the provisions of [the
recovery fund]. 196
If enacted by the Illinois legislature, this provision would require a
claimant to establish a broker's liability only once, at the broker's trial.
But the DRE could allege at the post-trial hearing that the judgment
was ineligible for recovery. For example, if all or some of the damages
awarded were for loss of market value, the claimant's loss would be
beyond the coverage of the fund. The DRE would not be obligated, as
the court in Jones v. Anderson197 implied, to interject issues at the bro-
ker's trial which are irrelevant to an assessment of his liability.198 But
this proposal should not be applicable to cases in which a judgment is
obtained against a broker following substituted service on the director
of the DRE.
Where substituted service is employed the judgment has no valid-
192. See text accompanying notes 146-54 supra.
193. See Chicago Tribune, Aug. 19, 1979, § 14, at 1. See generally Duty, supra note 6, at 15.
194. See Duty, supra note 6, at 16, in which the author states that in California, the "Commis-
sioner may-and on occasion does relitigate the entire case."
195. 9 Ariz. App. 54, 449 P.2d 71 (1968).
196. Id. at 57, 449 P.2d at 74.
197. 62 111. App. 3d 284, 379 N.E.2d 104 (1978).
198. Id. at 288-89, 379 N.E.2d at 106-07.
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ity against the licensee. 199 The real party of interest is the DRE, given
its status as manager of the recovery fund. The Illinois General Assem-
bly should combine the broker's trial and the post-trial hearing into one
proceeding once a party obtains a court order for substituted service.
In this proceeding, the legislature should permit the DRE to litigate all
issues pertaining to the broker's liability as well as whether the statu-
tory requirements of the fund have been met. This latter grant of au-
thority would allow the DRE, during this proceeding, to challenge
whether the substituted service order should have been granted by the
court.
Due Process and License Revocation
The revocation and suspension provisions of the various recovery
fund statutes differ in their protection of a licensee's due process rights.
The Illinois General Assembly could provide within the recovery fund
statute that a broker be given an opportunity to participate at the post-
trial hearing, as other states have.2°° But there are drawbacks to this
procedure. It allows the broker to question his own judicially estab-
lished liability. It permits the broker to attempt to thwart his judgment
creditor's recovery from the fund. Finally, it would complicate the
post-trial hearing.
The Illinois automatic termination provision which revokes the
broker's license and renders him ineligible to obtain another one until
the fund is repaid would appear to meet minimum procedural due
process standards. 20 But the legislature might also consider a codifica-
tion of the DRE's administrative practice in which the department
sends a letter to brokers whose activities result in payment from the
fund, allowing ten days to show cause why their licenses should not be
terminated.202
Nevertheless, the DRE must discontinue its practice of applying
the automatic termination clause when the broker is made a party by
substituted service. Such enforcement procedures are not authorized
by the statute,- nor do they comport with the broker's procedural due
199. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5718(a) (Supp. 1978).
200. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10473.1 (West Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.34 (West
Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-23.2-06 (1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 36-21-64
(1977).
201. See text accompanying notes 68-75 supra.
202. DRE Advisor, supra note 70. The Colorado recovery fund statute specifies that the li-
censing agency must give notice of hearing to the licensee to show cause why his license should
not be suspended or revoked when payment is made from the fund on account of his activities.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-304 (1978).
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process right to notice of the trial proceeding. 20 3 In response to these
criticisms, the DRE is considering the feasibility of alternative proce-
dures.2o4
The DRE is studying whether license revocation proceedings
should be instituted whenever the director of the DRE receives substi-
tuted service since a broker's failure to notify the department of his
current address is a ground for revocation. 205 Also, should a former
licensee apply for a new license, the DRE would assert its subrogation
rights in a new lawsuit if any monies were previously paid from the
fund on his account.20 6
The alternative procedures should be implemented. The state,
through the exercise of its regulatory function, has a compelling interest
in prohibiting a broker who evades service from working in that capac-
ity elsewhere in Illinois. 20 7 But it has a lesser interest in recouping
sums disbursed from the fund. The proposed administrative practices
comport with minimum requirements of procedural due process be-
cause they do not burden the broker with the payment of a judgment
obtained by substituted service, as a condition of eligibility for a new
license. They also provide better financial protection of the fund than
current procedures because any judgment that the DRE obtained
against a duly served former licensee would be directly enforceable
against him.
Supremacy Clause and Discharge in Bankruptcy
Illinois' statutory provision which states that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy does not alter the requirement that the recovery fund must be
reimbursed before a broker is eligible for another license, 20 is in direct
conflict with federal bankruptcy law. Congress has specified that the
bankruptcy court is the exclusive forum for determining the dis-
chargeability of debts involving fraud, misrepresentation or deceit. 20 9
203. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I11, § 5718(a) (Supp. 1978). See text accompanying notes 76-86
supra.
204. Letter from Henry Arkin, Technical Advisor for the DRE, to author (Jan. 7, 1980) (letter
on file at the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
205. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1I1, §§ 5730(a), 5732(e)(21) (1977).
206. Id. § 5722.
207. In recognition of this interest, the Illinois General Assembly exempted The Real Estate
Brokers and Salesmen License Act from the more stringent notice requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, id. ch. 127, §§ 1001-1021, 1010, requiring only that notice of a hearing be
mailed to the last known address of a broker. Id. ch. I 1l, § 5743.
208. Id. ch. 111, § 5718(d).
209. See text accompanying notes 99-106 supra.
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According to the rule stated by the United States Supreme Court, 210 the
Illinois recovery fund statute is in violation of the Federal Constitu-
tion's supremacy clause. The Illinois General Assembly may wait until
this provision is challenged in court before it amends the recovery fund
statute, or it may do so on its own initiative. The latter course would be
preferable since the legislature could enforce the Constitution without
sacrificing the aims of the present provision.
Ordinarily, the underlying debt of a claim for recovery from the
fund is not dischargeable in bankruptcy since a debt based upon
grounds such as fraud, misrepresentation or deceit cannot be dis-
charged if the creditor files a timely application in bankruptcy court
that the debt is not dischargeable. 21' Consequently, the Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly should require, as a condition of recovery from the
fund,2 12 that a claimant who has notice must contest in bankruptcy
court any judgment debt which a bankrupt attempts to discharge.
However, the claimant should not be required to wait until the bank-
ruptcy is concluded before recovering from the fund if all other statu-
tory requirements of the fund have been met. After a successful
claimant has assigned his rights in the judgment to the DRE, it should
be required to challenge in bankruptcy court any attempt by a former
licensee to discharge the debt, if proper notice is given.213
This proposed change in the fund's "discharge in bankruptcy"
provision would prevent, in a constitutional manner, a disciplined bro-
ker from obtaining a new license until the fund has been reimbursed.
It might also improve collection efforts because the DRE would hold a
valid judgment debt against the bankrupt yet his total pre-bankruptcy
liabilities would be diminished by the amount of his discharged
debts.214 Meanwhile, the DRE would hold a valid judgment debt
210. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
211. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2590 (1978) (to be codified
at I I U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (replacing I I U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976)).
212. Recently, in Buonincontro v. Kloppenborg, 61 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 378 N.E.2d 635 (1978),
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that the current statutory provision which
requires that a judgment creditor "has diligently pursued his remedies against all the judgment
debtors. . . in the transaction for which he seeks recovery from the Real Estate Recovery Fund,"
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I ll, § 5718(c)(6) (1977), does not mandate that a creditor allege that he has
challenged a broker's attempt to discharge a debt based upon fraud. 61 Ill. App. 3d at 1043-44,
378 N.E.2d at 637.
However, the DRE could have interposed the discharge of the debt as a defense to recovery
from the fund. The statute authorizes the DRE to "take whatever. . . action it deems appropriate
on behalf and in the name of the defendant." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 5721 (1977).
213. This requirement would encompass the situation where a disciplined licensee files for
bankruptcy after payment from the fund has been made.
214. See Shuchman, The FraudExceplion in Consumer Bankruptcy, 23 STAN. L. REV. 735, 739
(1971).
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against him.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Real Estate Recovery Fund is a valuable remedy for
members of the public who have been injured by the unlawful activities
of real estate licensees. However, the fund should not operate to the
detriment of a licensee's constitutional rights. While the DRE is
charged with administering the fund, this duty must be balanced
against the importance of retaining the fund as a genuine remedy of
last resort.
In order to promote the equitable and efficient operation of the
fund, the Illinois General Assembly should suspend the fund's liability
limitation for a single broker providing the balance in the fund at the
end of the previous year is greater than an amount specified by the
legislature. It should limit the binding effect of the broker's trial upon
the fund to the amount and fact of the broker's liability. The legisla-
ture should create an exception to this rule when judgment is obtained
against the broker on the basis of substituted service. In this situation,
the broker's trial and the post-trial hearing on whether the statutory
requirements of the fund have been satisfied should be combined in
one proceeding.
For constitutional and statutory reasons, the DRE must end its
practice of automatically terminating the licenses of brokers upon pay-
ment from the fund when substituted service is used. Instead, the DRE
should implement its scheme to institute license revocation proceedings
and exercise its subrogation rights. Finally, to avoid conflict with fed-
eral bankruptcy law, the Illinois General Assembly should repeal the
recovery fund provision which requires a broker who has been dis-
charged in bankruptcy from a judgment debt to reimburse the fund
prior to the issuance of another license. Instead, the judgment creditor
should be required to contest in bankruptcy court a discharge of a judg-
ment debt as a condition of recovery from the fund. Where the fund
has satisfied a claim, the DRE should be charged with the duty of con-
testing the broker's subsequent discharge of a judgment debt in bank-
ruptcy court.
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